While holding institutions accountable for security breaches is essential, some industry observers question whether a flat monetary penalty is the most effective way to improve cybersecurity. Critics argue that fines often act as a 'cost of doing business' rather than a catalyst for genuine technical improvement. In the case of the CDSL malware attack, the focus should perhaps remain on the technical remediation and the systemic gaps that allowed the breach to occur, rather than just the financial punishment.
There is a concern that focusing on penalties might encourage companies to prioritize compliance documentation over actual security innovation. If an organization is primarily worried about avoiding regulatory fines, it may invest in 'check-the-box' security measures that satisfy auditors but fail to stop sophisticated, evolving cyber threats. A more effective approach might involve mandatory, transparent technology audits and collaborative efforts between the regulator and the industry to share threat intelligence.
Furthermore, the impact of such fines on a public-listed company is ultimately borne by shareholders, who have little control over the day-to-day IT operations of the firm. If the goal is to protect the market, the regulator must ensure that its actions lead to tangible upgrades in infrastructure rather than just transferring funds from the company to the government treasury.
Moving forward, the industry needs to see a shift toward more collaborative security frameworks. If the regulator continues to rely solely on punitive measures, it risks creating an adversarial relationship that could hinder the open communication necessary to combat modern cybercrime. True security requires a partnership where the regulator provides guidance and the industry provides transparency, rather than a system defined by fines and defensive posturing.