The decision to pass a Money Bill that expands the number of judges raises serious constitutional concerns, as it circumvents the bicameral scrutiny normally required for structural changes to the judiciary. By classifying the increase of judges as a financial matter, the government sidesteps the Rajya Sabha, potentially undermining the balance of power envisioned by the Constitution.
Critics argue that the judiciary’s independence could be compromised when its size is altered through a legislative shortcut. The Constitution mandates that any amendment affecting the courts must receive a two‑thirds majority in both houses, ensuring broad consensus. Bypassing this safeguard sets a risky precedent for future reforms that may not be as benign.
Legal scholars warn that the Supreme Court itself may be called upon to adjudicate the bill’s validity, leading to a protracted legal battle that could further delay justice. The very courts that stand to gain new judges might be tasked with ruling on the legality of their own expansion.
Moreover, the lack of detailed criteria for appointing the additional judges raises questions about merit, regional representation, and potential politicization of appointments. Stakeholders such as senior judges and opposition parties fear that the move could be used to tilt the ideological balance of the higher judiciary.
While reducing case backlogs is a legitimate goal, opponents contend that a more transparent, constitutionally sound process would preserve institutional integrity and public trust. They call for a proper amendment debate in both houses rather than a rushed financial maneuver.
If the challenge succeeds, the bill could be struck down, leaving the judiciary unchanged and highlighting the importance of adhering to constitutional procedures for any structural reform.