The Attorney-General’s Chambers and legal representatives for the defense maintain that the royal prerogative of mercy is a unique constitutional power that stands outside the reach of the judiciary. By arguing that the process is non-justiciable, they emphasize that the Federal Constitution grants the Yang di-Pertuan Agong the authority to exercise mercy without the interference of the court system. This perspective holds that the separation of powers is a fundamental principle, and subjecting the Pardons Board to judicial review would effectively undermine the constitutional design of the pardon mechanism.
From this viewpoint, the decision-making process is an integrated whole that culminates in the King’s final act. If the court were to allow a judicial review of the board’s deliberations, it would be forced to examine the very advice and considerations provided to the monarch, which is seen as an encroachment on the royal prerogative. Proponents of this view argue that the law is clear: the courts have no jurisdiction to second-guess the exercise of mercy, as doing so would turn a constitutional act of grace into a standard administrative decision subject to litigation.
Furthermore, this position suggests that the Malaysian Bar’s attempt to distinguish between the board’s administrative role and the King’s power is a legal technicality that does not change the reality of the challenge. By seeking to block future pardon applications or suspend the current reduction, the Bar is effectively trying to exert control over a process that is intended to be final. Maintaining this boundary is considered essential for preserving the stability of the constitutional order and respecting the established limits of judicial authority in Malaysia.